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THE PERCEPTION AND MEMORY OF
WITNESSES
DiLLARD S. GAIRDNER*
The vast majority of testimonial errors-and every trial lawyer
knows they are numerous-are those of the average, normal honest
man, errors unknown to the witness and wholly unintentional, repre-
sented in the great body of testimony which is subjectively accurate
but objectively false. What are the factors determining the accuracy
and reliability of the memory of a particular witness? Juries quite
generally regard the assertiveness and positiveness of the witness
as the best test of accuracy, but experimental psychology has demon-
strated that the most positive feeling of accuracy is no guarantee of, or
evidence of, the truthfulness of the testimony.' This is not the only
nugget of scientific fact with which the legal psychologists are quietly
discrediting the ex cathedra vaporings of appellate judges, the tech-
nical and involved commentaries of biologists and physiologists, and
the dry, mechanical theories of the behaviorists and mechanists.
Memory is a matter for the psychologists, yet even they differ among
themselves-the objectivists use "memory" in a strained, technical
sense,2 the imagists consider it almost solely a question of imagery,3
the gestaltists are fairly losing themselves in metaphysics.4 Little
wonder that lawyers and jurists, generally, have been unable to learn
anything of the true nature of memory.- Upon what bases shall we
test the reliability of testimony which is neither perjured nor the
product of unsound minds?6 What of value, concerning memory,
*Member of the North Carolina bar. A.B., LL.B., U.N.C.
'The variability of memory is generally recognized: OSBORN, THE PROBLEM OF
PROOF, pp. 195, x96; MfINSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND, p. 155; 23 C. J.,
Evid., § 1765, n. 9; Kinleside v. Harrison, (Eng.) 2 Philhim. 449, 534; 161 Rep.
1196. "The feeling of accuracy is no proof of correct reproduction." SWIFT,
Psy. AND DAY'S WORK, p. 288. To same effect: MIONSTERBERG, supra, p. 56;
ARNOLD, G. F., PsY. APPLIED LEG. EVID., (i9o6) p. 172-180.
2WATSON, PSY. FROM STANDPT. BEHAVIORIST, (1929) 335.
3Allport Eidetic Imagery (1924) 15 BRIT. J. Psy.
4KoFFKA, THE GROWTH OF MIND, (1924); M. WERTHEIMER, DREI ABHAND-
LUNGEN ZUI GESTALTTHEORIE, (Erlfangen-1925).
6"The behaviorist never uses the term memory. He believes it has no place in
an objective psychology." WATSON, BEHAvIORISM 177.
6C. T. McCormick, Deception Tests and Law of Evidence, (1926) 15 CAL. L.
REV. 484; AM. J. POLICE SCIENCE (Sept.-Oct. I931). Association, breathing, and
blood pressure techniques discussed in detail. BuRTT, LEG. Psy. (1931) 177-
256; "Scopolamin anaesthesia" is treated in Herzog's MED. JURISPRUD. (1931)
§ 472; the pneumocardio-sphygmometer is explained by J. A. Larsen from his
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can the infant science, legal psychology, today present to trial
lawyers?
The basic principle in memory is the law of association-if two
states of consciousness have been experienced together, when one of
them enters consciousness the other tends to follow (the concept
of contiguity), and of two objects having characteristics in common,
the sight of one arouses the recall of the other (the concept of simi-
larity).7 What recollection memory shall call forth by reason of a
particular stimulus is determined by a host of factors which have
been grafted upon this fundamental law of association. These vari-
ous factors have been grouped under various "principles of associ-
ation". Thorndike names two: frequency, the law of exercise,8 and
pleasure, the law of effect; 9 Watson names frequency and recency; °
Hunter favors frequency, recency, and the "neural processes under-
lying pleasure;"" for our purposes the most suitable would appear
to be: frequency, recency, and intensity.2
Upon frequency all are in agreement: We tend to remember what we
observe or recall frequently. National advertisers annually spend
millions in reliance upon this truth. The witness who has observed
the scene repeatedly or upon several occasions recounted his evidence
in detail, to the lawyer, will not inadvertently change the' details
materially on the witness stand, for the images are kept alive, or
revived, by these repetitions." This repetition, to a tactful and
sympathetic lawyer, has a further desired effect: The witness in-
creasingly tends to recount the evidence in the light most favorable
to the lawyer's view of the case.14
As to recency: The more recent the experience, the better the memory of
Report before the 45th Am. Bar Ass'n, in MEDICO-LEGAL JOURNAL, Vol. 40, No. I
(1923). As to questions of lying among neurotics and psychotics, see HEALY,
PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION AND SWINDLING (1915).
7BuRTT, LEG. PsY. (1931) 68; WOODWORTH, Psy. A STUDY OF MENT. LIFE
395-.398; WUNDT, HUMAN AND ANIMAL PsY. 296, 297; SULLY, OUTs. PSY. 214.
'THORNDIKE, EDUC. PsY., Brief. Course, p. 256-257.
9THORNDIRE, PSY. OF LEARNING, (1913).
10WATSON, BEHAvIOR, (1914), C. VII.
IIUNTER, GEN. Psy. 331.
12Carr, H. A., Principles of Selection in Animal Learning, (1914) 21 PsY. RE-
vIEw 157.
1 3
"The value of repeating facts in strengthening memory is well known."
MCCARTY, PSY. FOR LAWYER, p. 225, 228; ARNOLD, Psy. APPLIED LEG. EVID.
105, 403; SULLY, OUTL. PSY. 214; TITCHENER, A BEGINNER'S PSY. 186; WILLIAM
JAMES, PRIN. PSY., Vol. I, p. 373.
14[IOFFMAN, PSY. AND COMMON LIFE, 69; SWIFT, PSY. AND DAY'S WoRi 29o,
JAMES, PRIN. PsY., Vol. I, 372-373.
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it.1r You remember the tie you wore yesterday, but scarcely the one
you wore last Christmas. The speed with which we forget is shown
graphically in the "curve of forgetting," demonstrating that we for-
get very rapidly immediately after the perception according to a law
of progressively diminishing speed, 8 a progressive fading of mem-
ory.' 7 Ebbinghaus, working with nonsense syllables, found 55.8%
forgotten the first hour, 65% the first half-day, 75% the first week;18
later studies show 56% after an hour, 64% after 8 hours, 66% after
one day. 19 Strong, testing memory of words, found 27% forgotten in
5 minutes, 42% in 30 minutes, 6o% in 8 hours, 71% in a day, and go%
in a week.20 In trials witnesses usually testify as to details of views or
scenes, rather than words or syllables or symbols; Dallenbach testing
memory of a picture or scene found 14% forgotten in 5 days, 18%
after 15 days, 22% after 45 days,2' but these witnesses were warned
that they would be tested later and probably observed more care-
fully than they would have otherwise. As yet we have no study of
an actual scene, in which moving pictures have secretly been taken,
against which to check the evidence of witnesses (which would most
nearly approximate actual conditions) but the true rate of forgetting,
for witnesses, as to words spoken should be slightly less rapid than the
rates of Strong, and as to visual scenes recalled should be slightly more
rapid than the rates of Dallenbach. Clearly enough, we quickly
forget the bulk of what we perceive, our retention decreasing as the
time interval increases. Claim agents and adjusters long ago learned
the difference in the value of a statement one day after an accident
and one a month after it; every trial lawyer knows how disconcerting
it may be to have a witness, on cross examination, confronted with an
old and forgotten signed statement. Signed statements from all
important witnesses, at the first opportunity, in personal injury cases,
are especially important where the trial may be long delayed or the
15
"Memory is clear and strong in proportion to its recency." 23 C. J., Evid.,
§ 1764; JAMES PRIN. PsY., Vol. I, p. 670.
16STRATTON, EXPERIMENT. PSY. 169.
17Bean, The Curve of Forgetting, PsycuoL. ARCHIVES, No. 21.
18EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY, A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPER. PSYCHOLOGY, (1913
Trans.); HUNTER, GEN. PSY. 329; GATES, ELEM. PsY. 329; WOODWORTH, PsY. A
STUDY OF MENT. LIFE, at p. 350, showing Ebbinghaus graph.
*
9BuRTT, LEG. PSY., p. 88; Radossawljewitch's studies: HUNTER, GEN. PSY., p.
329.
20Strong, Effect of Time Interval upon Recognition Memory, 20 PsY. REv. 339;
WOODWORTH, Psy. A STUDY OF MENT. LIFE, p. 351.
2'Dallenbach, The Relation of Memory Err or to Time Interval, 2o PsY. REV. 323;
WOODWORTH, PsY. A STUDY OF MENT. LIFE, p. 352.
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opposing side has constant or easy access to the witnesses. Where an
entry, notation, or memorandum is made weeks after the incident, it
is both good lawn and sound psychology to allow it to be used to
refresh recollection, but the trial judge should carefully safeguard this
procedure from. abuse, as it may have been written at a time when
the curve of forgetting shows a large part of the matter forgotten and
possibly inaccurate details supplied.2 4 Entries in account books,
made at the time, are admissible in evidence under certain con-
ditions;2 in determining what is "at the time", the curve of forgetting
should govern. If two conflicting statements of the same witness
about the same incident be brought out in evidence, it is proper for
the judge to instruct that the jury may give greater credit to the state-
ment nearer the incident described, 26 and from the psychological
viewpoint it would be his duty to do so.
Intensity-the emotional factor-includes many lesser ideas: The
more vivid, striking, or impressive the scene, the clearer and more re-
tentive the memory of it.27 The extraordinary, colorful, novel, 28 un-
usual,2 9 and interesting0 scenes attract our attention and hold our
interest, both attention and interest being important aids to mem-
ory.3' The opposite of this principle is inversely true-routine, com-
monplace and insignificant circumstances are rarely remembered as
specific incidents-and this is accepted by our courts;3 2 memory for
incidental details not attended to is poor, as these are not fixated or
nWIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Vol. I, § 761; Rosenmann v. Belk-Williams Co., 191
N. C. 493, 132 S. E. 282 (1926).
DWe tend to remember in "constellations" and the more details we can recall to
the witness, the more apt he is to recall a forgotten item: BuRft, LEG. PsY., pp.
76-77.
24Supra notes 20, 21. 23 C. J., EvId., § 1769, n. 34, 35, 36.
2sWiGMORE, EVID., Vol. III, § 2118; Dyeing Co. v. Hosiery Co., 126 N. C. 292,
35 S. E. 586 (19oo).
2623 C. J. Evid. § 1764, n. 80-24 cases cited.
2 7
HERZOG, MED. JURISPRUD., p. 433; WOODWORTH, Psy. A STUDY OF MENT.
Lim, p. 345, 379.28Novelty and interest aid memory. 23 C. J., Eid., § 1764, n. 82, citing JAMES,
PRINC. Psy., Vol. I, p. 673.
2923 C. J. ERid. § 1764, notes 86, 93.
30HERZOG, MED. JURISPRUD., p. 435. Uninteresting things may not be re-
tamined in memory: Hayden v. Suff6lk Mfg. Co., ii Fed. Cas. 9oo (1862), aff. 3
Wall (U. S.) 315; 18 L. Ed. 76 (1866); Swain v. Edmunds, 53 N. J. Eq. 142; 32
Atl. 369 (I894), aff'd 54 N. J. Eq. 438, 37 Atl. 1174 (1896).
31
"Attention is proportional to new and interesting character." JAMES, PRINC.
Psy., Vol. I, p. 673.
32Especially is this true in proof of the attestation of signatures. 23, C. J.,
Evidence, § 1764, n. 86, 87, 88, 89, 90.
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impressed upon the mind.3  Surprise or shock, such as an auto
accident or a sudden shooting, draws attention to the causes of the
emotion and thus divides the attention as to the incident itself and
details immediately following it, rendering memory for events just
prior to the emotion particularly keen," that for events accompanied
by or following the emotion less reliable.35 Shock, fright or pain
impress the event upon the mind;3 6 fear, pleasure or pain aid re-
tention.3 7 Emotional disturbance inhibits accurate perception while
it exists or immediately thereafter, 38 Jaffa finding the memory error
17% greater than when emotion and feeling were absent.3 9 The law
recognizes that a startling occurrence may cause the witness to be
particularly observant of the causes, 40 and that excitement or com-
motion attending an incident tends to produce discrepancies in the
narratives of witnesses .4  The principle of intensity is the basis for
the admission of spontaneous declarations immediately after an
accident or injury; the law assumes that this state of physical shock
or nervous excitement prevents the creation of falsehood and is
sufficient assurance of subjective and objective accuracy with refer-
nHarvard students (ioo) asked to observe every act professor did during a
given time interval; with left hand he held up a spinning color wheel, with the
other did six distinct acts including removing cigarette from case and snapping
case shut. Eighteen students saw only his holding the spinning wheel. MiJNSTER-
BERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND, p. 29. Myers presented cards containing certain
letters, asking subjects to observe the number of O's; the cards were yellow, the
border black dots, and the letters red; only I in 45o noted these, one-half recalled
color of background of cards, one-half the color of the letters, one-fourth the color
of the border. G. C. Myers, A Study of Incidental Memory, ARCHIVES OF PSY.
(1913), No.26. Achilles found incidental memory of nonsense syllables 81%, but
memory of names of photographs shown, only 57%. E. M. Achilles, Experi-
mental Studies in Recall and Recognition, AaCHIVES Psy. (1920), No. 44.
34"Memory for events just previous to a violent emotion is keener than for
events immediately after, or events accompanied by emotion." Stratton, Retro-
active hyperamnesia, (1919), 26 Psy. REV., 474. Whittey, however, could not
find this. Whittey, The Dependence of Learning and Recall -upon Prior Mental and
Physical Condition, (1924), 7 J. E XPER. PSY. p. 42M.
3"Emotions (surprise, shock, etc.) narrow attention to the particular stimulus
that aroused them.. .thus draws the attention away from the thing to be de-
scribed." HUNTER, GEN. Psy., p. 134.
36HERZOG, MED. JURISPRUD., p. 433.
37 ARNOLD, PsY. APPLIED LEG. EVID., p. 185.
'
8BuRTT, LEG. PsY., p. 73, 78, 441.
39S. Jaffa, Ein Psychologische Experiment im Kriminal Seminar der Universitat
Berlin, cited, BuRTT, LEG. PsY., p. 72.
4023 C. J., Evid., § 1764, n. 92, 93, 95.
"Giltner v. Gorham, io Fed. Cas., 424,4 McLean 402 (1848); U. S. v. McGlue,
26 Fed. Cas. 1092, I Curt. I (185I); Williamsv. Hall, I Curt. Eccl. 597.
41 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Vol. III, § 1747 I).
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ence to the observed causal details just prior to the existence of the
emotion, but law should, but does not, note that after the emotion
appears the reliability of the perception (subjective accuracy) is lost.
An auto driver, who experiences no emotion until after the dangerous
incident is passed, would be a reliable witness as to the details of the
incident, but a guest, who saw the danger and screamed when the dan-
ger first appeared, would be quite unreliable as to details after the fear
was felt by the guest. The suggestion has been made that state-
ments made immediately after the emotion subsides, upon rigorous
cross-examination, should yield the highest practical degree of ac-
curacy at any time obtainable.43
In addition to recency, frequency, and intensity we find certain
miscellaneous factors affecting memory; for example, the "pleasure
principle"-we remember best what we like, next what we dislike, and
poorest of all those things to which we are indifferent." Too, accuracy
and retention are affected by whether the detail was barely noticed
(underlearned), observed with average attention (learned), or care-
fully, repeatedly scrutinized (overleamed).45 Further, the existence
of fatigue in the witness, the rapidity with which details crowd upon
the perceptive faculties, the absence of interfering habits, associations
and distractions-all prevent the fixation of details and the establish-
ment of neural paths and associations, with resultant poor memory,"
while a paralyzing shock or blow upon the head may destroy all
recent fixations, with resulting total loss of memory of the events im-
mediately preceding the shock or blow, indicating that it takes time
for the perceptions to register upon the brain and that they must not
be either crowded or shaken until "set. ' 47
Concentrated attention4 8 coupled with the intention to remember"
constitutes "study"5 0 and naturally improves memory. Rarely do
3Hutchins, R. M. and Slesinger, D., Some Observations on the Law of Evidence
(1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 432-440.
"Children asked to list foods, animals, and colors, then asked, to list those they
liked and disliked. Check showed first list ran high for those liked, next for those
disliked, and lowest for those to which they were indifferent. G. C. Myers,
Affective Factors in Recall. (1915) 12 J. PHIL. AND SCIEN. METHODS'85.
41Luh, The Condition of Retention (1922) 31 PsY. MONOGRAPHS No. 142; Tol-
man, The Effects of Underlearning Upon Short and Long Term Retention, (1923),
J. EXPER. PsY., p. 466.
46HUNTER, GEN. PSY., p. 317.
47BURTT, LEG. PsY., pp. 78,79, 80; HERZOG, MED. JURISPRUD., p. 436.
48JAMES, PRIN. PSY., VOI. i, p. 669; Attention is reflected in memory, and is
dependent upon: intensity of stimulus, novelty, motion, size, contrast, and inter-
estingness-BuRTT, LEG. PsY., PP. 57-70. '9BuRTT, LEG. Psy., p. 81.
50',Studying", "memorizing", "getting lessons"-are familiar examples.
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witnesses study the details at the time of the incident or event, but
where the fact continues to exist (a scene of accident, a boundary line,
or a dangerous machine) the witness may be carried to the object or
location and the important minutiae impressed upon him; courts
have noted that this improves memory"
It is now clear that "memory" is but a term, a concept, expressing a
group of ideas related to a particular type of mental process. The
range of memory, in its general acceptance, is from the time of re-
cording of the perception to the time of narration, but for the purpose
of studying the accuracy of memory a broader range must be ex-
amined: Faulty or defective perception originally cause many errors;
equally as many are caused by the imagination of the witness and
suggestions from others. Mansterberg observed that "the obser-
vation itself may be defective and illusory; wrong associations may
make it imperfect; judgments may misinterpret the experience; and
the suggestive influence may falsify the data of the senses."5' 2 We
have considered memory proper, but of defective perception or the
effect of imagination and suggestion, all pertinent psychological
concepts, we have as yet said little. The following comments upon
these are merely suggestive and in no sense exhaustive.
The vision of so-called normal people varies greatly; all men do not
see with the same degree of accuracy nor with the same speed of per-
ception. Witnesses often have visual defects. Hyperopia (far-
sightedness) renders the witness unreliable as to events quite near and
plainly discernible to normal eyes; myopia (near-sightedness) dis-
credits the witness as to events at any distance from the defective
eyes. Both of these are more prevalent than we suspect. There are
other and rarer defects of refraction and restricted vision, such as
anisometropia, amblyopia, hemianopsia, which might affect the
credit of testimony. Whenever the witness wears glasses, or even
shows the squint of eye-strain, especially if the witness is younger
than advanced middle-age, it is well to determine whether the defect
may account for any disparity in testimony.
Color-blindness is common enough to enter into testimony where
traffic signals, color of clothes, etc., are involved.> Inability to dis-
51"Impressions... are lasting or transitory in proportion to the degree of at-
tention.... "Dean v. Dean, 42 Ore. 290, 296, 70 Pac. io39, 1041 (1902); 23 C. J.
Evid., § 1764, n. 91, 95.
52MYINSTERBERG, supra., note 33, P. 56; BURTT, supra, note 47, pp. 14, 66, ioi.
OJastrow found one man saw, ioo% accurately, in 8 mins. 35 secs. what an-
other saw only 35% accurately in 9 mins. 55 secs. OSBORN, PROBLEM OF PROOF, p.
392.
uOne man in 25, one woman in 200, is color blind. BURTT, supra, note 47, p. 20.
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tinguish between red and green is the most common form. A simple,
effective test is to have the witness choose certain colors from a box
of assorted skeins of yarn. Even in normal persons colors seen from
the side of the eye or in dim illumination, are rarely correctly per-
ceived.
Acuity of vision decreases as illumination decreases; a witness
recognizing minute details or colors in twilight, dim moonlight, or
on a dark night should be checked carefully, as should the vision of
one moving suddenly from a bright light into a dim one, and vice
versa.55 Much variability exists in all perceptions involving judg-
ments, estimates and comparisons. We tend to overestimate vertical
objects, lines, and distances (height of buildings, distance up hills),
the size of a large object among smaller ones (a dagger among pocket
knives, a large man among women), and small angles, tending to see
them as right angles (collision of cars), but we tend to underestimate
any filled space (a yard full of people compared with several empty
yards, a single well-furnished room as compared with several empty
ones) and a small object surrounded by large ones (a small woman
among men) ; all these are revealed by experimental studies.16
Auditory perception is best in witnesses from 7 to 18, 79.2% being
able to hear ordinary conversation at 25 to 50 feet, but only 1o.5% of
persons over 5o could so hear, and not one in a ioo could hear it at 50
feet as against 46 otit of every xoo such young people.5 7  A sound
directly in front, overhead, or behind a witness can not be located by
the sound alone due to the equal force of the sound waves on each ear,
and estimations of the distance of the sound are quite unreliable unless
the sounds are very familiar and distinctly heard.' In feeling, the
touch of a cold, smooth surface is perceived frequently as wet.' On
the tongue we can distinguish between two points i /25 inch apart,
but on the thigh, a very insensitive area, we can not recognize the
touch of two points unless they are 2Y2 inches apart; other portions
of the body show sensitivities between these extremes;59 these facts
may be of value in determining the type of weapon inflicting injury.
In poisoning cases, the fact that the same substances taste differ-
55BuRTT, supra, note 47, PP. 23-24.
56BuRTT, supra, pp. x4-30; Estimates of object large enough to cover full moon,
at arm's length, ranged from a pea (correct) to a carriage wheel-MtNSTERBERG,
supra note33, p. 27; Notes, infra, (1) 22, 23, 24.
5 7HANs GROSS, CRIM. PSY., (trans. by Kallen-i9s1), p. 187, citing Bezold.
68An invisible tuning fork sounded was compared to a bell, a lion's growl, a
steam whistle, and said to be rumbling, clear, sharp, whistling, by the various
listeners. MfNSTERBERG, supra note 33, p. 24.
5OBuRTT, supra note 47, PP. 34-38.
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ently in different parts of the mouth, due to the location of the various
taste buds, may be of importance.60 In cases involving whiskey, it is
worthwhile to note that illusions of smell and wide variation in the
acuteness 6f olfactory faculties are common, and that officers smell
what they want to smell.6'
In judgment of speed, practically every automobile wreck case
produces testimonial variations of from 5% to 25% as to speed; even
greater variations have been studied.62  The judgment of speed of
motion with which one moves, in the dark or with eyes shut, is almost
valueless. We observe the speed of objects across the line of vision
much more accurately than speed towards us, as every bird-hunter
has observed; the greater the noise the higher we are likely to judge
the speed, and the higher the actual speed the smaller the percentage
of error in estimating it. Extensive experience in driving cars or ob-
serving speeds make the estimates more accurate, affecting the credit
and weight of the testimony.6
In judging time intervals we overestimate idle intervals as com-
pared with intervals during which we are busy,6 but even idle inter-
vals are poorly estimated. 5 If much happens in a short time, we
overestimate the time-interval.6 The perceptibility of objects and
forces depend upon their own intensity and their background (a
bright headlight may not be noticed in a brightly lighted street; a pis-
tol shot may not be heard in a noisy factory). Estimates of numbers
in a group vary from 5o% below to 400% above the correct number.6 7
Law has noted many of these human errors. 8
10HUNTER, GEN. Psy., p. 239.
61HANS GROSS, supra note 57, P- 187 et seq.; CHARLES C. MOORE, TREATISE ON
FACTS, (igo8), Vol. I, C. VI.
"
1The speed of a hand moving around a dial every 5 seconds was judged at
from 4 inches a sec. and Y4 mile per hour (correct) and from pace of a snail or a
funeral cortege to an express train or the fastest automobile, from I rev. per sec. to
I rev. per 45 sec., from 7 miles to 4o miles per hour. M iNSTERBERG, supra note
33, P. 23. 63BURTT, supra note 47, PP. 37-43.
"Unpublished experiments of author; see BURTT, supra note 47, P. 43.
0 Estimates of a given ten second interval varied from 3 to 6o seconds, of a
three second interval varied from Y2 to i5 seconds. MIJNSTERBERG, supra note
33, P. 22. 66PORTER, THE HUMAN INTELLECT, § 565.
67Estimates of the number of black squares on a card containing 5o, ranged
from 25 to 200, for one containing 20, from 10 to 70. MiONSTEiBERG, supra note
33, P. 20.
68Exact and harmonious testimony as to time intervals is not expected, and if
given tends to discredit the witnesses. 23 C. J., Evid. § 1778. The proverbial
inaccuracy of evidence as to dates and time of day (23 C. J. Evid. § 1777) oral.
statements (ibid. § 1775), contents of written instruments (ibid. § 1776), and as"
to transactions involving a large number of dates, names, amounts, etc. (ibid.
§ 1765, n. 99).
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Concerning uneducated and ignorant witnesses, McCarty insists
that "the less the education and mental activity" the better the per-
ception and memory,69 and law recognizes the acute memories of
illiterate persons in business.7 0 Experimental data are lacking, but
every trial lawyer has noted that elderly negroes, bright children, and
illiterate tenants often are very forceful witnesses; the intelligent
educated man divides his attention between perceiving and inter-
preting his perceptions; the greater the attention to abstract ideas,
the less we perceive of facts,7' and the less we theorize, the more we
can visualize.72
Amnesia (forgetfulness) in old age is common, usually the least
remote details being first forgotten, childhood experiences being the
most persistent in memory;73 as details are forgotten there is a de-
cided tendency to fill in the gaps in memory, this paramnesia (false
memory) often being so unobtrusive that it is difficult to determine
the actual from the imagined, as in the case of reputation evidence as
to pedigree and boundaries, and the courts have noted this tend-
ency 7 4 Adults remember many incidents of childhood, 7 the child
mind being visual rather than meditative, and being alert, receptive
and uncrowded is impressed by the novel and interesting character
of what it perceives and witnesses; courts note this, but wisely advise
the careful scrutiny of perceptions of the witness recalled from the age
of seven or eight years,78 or younger.
What memory does not recall, the imagination tends to supply-
unconsciously as a rule, half-consciously where bias or suggestion
exists, and consciously in whole-cloth perjury.7 7 As memory fades,
imagination retouches the details; where this is done unconsciously,
therefore honestly, we are apt to recall what we think should have
normally occurred, or, if personally involved, what we wish had oc-
curred, or what, from suggestions now half-forgotten, we believe
69MCCARTY, supra note 13, p. 225.
7023 C. J. Evid., § 1766.
71HANs GROSS, CRIM. PsY., p. 258.
nARNOLD, Psy. APPLIED TO LEG. EVID., p. 105.
1SJAMES, supra note 31, Vol. I, p. 661; BuRTT, supra note 47, p. 90.
7
'Courts have recognized these truths almost in their entirety. 23 C. J. Evd.
§ 1767.
75JAMES, supra note 31, p. 66I.
7623 C. J. Evid. § 1768. G. Pfhaler (1926) and M. J. Varendonck (1911) showed
that witnesses under eight to ten years, however positive, are particularly subject
to suggestion and unreliable. Also see BURTT, supra note 47, pp. 104-1o5.
77"The most frequent source of false memory is the accounts we give to others of
our experiences. Such accounts we almost always make both more simple and
more interesting than the truth." JAMES, supra note 3 1, p. 373.
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occurred. Our courts take cognizance of this. 78 The merest skeleton
of fact, repeatedly told, bodies forth as a complete, truthful narrative,
"ere long fiction expels reality from memory and reigns in its stead
alone"79 and "unconscious impressions" blend with "conscious
realities", 8 playing havoc with objective truth. This "filling-in" of
memory occurs so unconsciously that it does not even affect the
positive belief or manner of the witness.8 ' The nature of memqry
processes accomplishes this; upon recall there is a strong tendency to
"sketch in missing details" and, further, the words used do not
indicate the vagueness of the recollection,2 thus evidence "grows."
Memory is more than the re-instatement of the original perception; it
involves the interpretation of details, judgment, estimates, and the
correlation of related incidents. Imagination and suggestion are
twin-artists ever ready to retouch the fading daguerrotype of memory.
Just as "Nature abhors a vacuum", the mind abhors an uncom-
pleted picture, and paints in the details, careless indeed as to whether
the old picture is reproduced faithfully.8
The damaging effect of imagination is often re-inforced by the
expectative factor in recall, that element which causes us to perceive
(or remember that we perceived) what we expect to perceive rather
than what actually occurs, a mental set for a definite situation causing
78"The effort of the memory often supplies circumstances harmonious with the
general impression of a fact or event, but which are supplied only by the imagi-
nation and the association of ideas." Choate, J. in The Swedish Bark Adolph,
(U. S. Dist. Ct. So. Dist. N. Y.) 4 Fed. 730 (188o); Cunningham v. Burdell, 4
Bradf. Surr. 343 (N. Y. 1857); West Jersey R. Co. v. Thomas, 23 N. J. Eq. 431,
438 (1873) aff. 24 N. J. Eq. 567 (1874). "A witness may form and intensify an
impression by perpetually thinking on the subject." U. S. v. McKee, 26 Fed.
Cas. ixOI (1876); Pierce v. Brady (Eng.) 23 Beav. 64, 71, 53 Repr. 25 (1856).
In People v. Storrs, 207 N. Y. 147, IO N. E. 730 (1912) six witnesses swore they
saw the document signed, yet expert and other evidence showed conclusively that
it was forged. The classic example of the effect of imagination is the Twitchell
murder case, in which the husband killed his wife, then went out and opened
the gate to throw suspicion on some outsider. But, the servant, who was in the
habit of opening the gate every morning, swore she opened it that particular
morning, convicting the husband, who later confessed in detail. This case is com-
mented upon by Wigmore (PRIX. JUD. PROOF, p. 259) and Wellman (ART OF
CROSS-EXAmINATION, p. 146).
79JAMES, PRIN. Psy., Vol. I, p. 373.
8
°MCCARTY, PSY. FOR LAWYER, p. 237 cit. SWIFT, PSY. AND DAY's WORK, p.
280.
"It is extremely easy after a short time to mix up what we imagine with what
we actually recall." HOFFMAN, PSY. AND COMMON LIFE, p. 68.
82Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory
(1928) 4V HARV. L. REv. 860, 867.
8JAmEs, supra note 31, Vol. I, p. 373.
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us to mistake a similar one for the one expected-the moaning night-
wind for a human cry, an innocent tramp for the escaped convict, the
document presented for the one formerly attested-and the more
similar the expected and the presented object the more positive and
more certain the recognizer becomes,"4 but even a superficial similar-
ity will deceive a suggestible or hysterical witness, for imagination
and suggestion co-operating will re-write the perceptual truth until it
is unrecognizable.88
Witnesses vary widely in their suggestibility, from victims of
hysteria86 or hypnosis,8 7 who accept unquestioningly the most absurd
suggestions as true, to strong-willed individualists who not only react
negatively to suggestion but tend to become antagonistic toward the
suggested facts.8 8 Suggestion literally "devastates memory,''89 and
its power is increased by any factor which renders the individual un-
critical, submissive, and acquiescent.8 0 A study of magazine ad-
vertising will reveal many factors aiding suggestion-the prestige or
authority of the one making the suggestion (a noted expert), the age
of the suggester (parent to child), the race of the suggester (white
man to negro), the repetition or frequency of suggestion, the feeling of
insignificance or one-person-out-of-many, (individual in a mob),"'
which latter may be called the influence of majority opinion,912 and to
these we should add self-interest, and bias.
Cross-examination offers an often-ignored opportunity to discover
,he effect of suggestion-whether the witness has been coached, is a
U"The deceptive certainty of the recognizer increases with the similarity to the
original material." Lund, The Criteria of Confidence, 37 AmERiCAN J. PsY. 372.
Six familiar pictures of white children were picked from pictures of horses, houses,
or negroes with accuracy up to 80% and 85%, from pictures of other white chil-
dren with 50% accuracy, and from pictures of similar white children with less than
20% accuracy. Feingold, Recognition and Discrimination, Psy. Mo N. (i915),
No. 78.
nHans Gross notes, "It is difficult to believe how far the imagination of the
emotional, though highly intellectual, persons will carry them." CRIM. INVESTI-
GATION, (Adam Trans.) pp. 77-90.
86HERZOG, MED. JURISPRUD., § 386.
37GATEs, ELEM. Psy., p. 394; WOODWORTH, Psy. A STUDY OF MENT. LIrE, p.
547-
18ARXOLD, Psy. APPLIED TO LEG. EVID., p. 468.
89
"One factor more than anything else devastates memory and plays havoc
with our best intended recollections: that is the power of suggestion." MiYNSTER-
EERG, supra note 33, p. 67.
"HUNTER, GEN. PSY., p. 109.
91E. A. Ross, SocrAL PsY., cited in HUNTER, GEN. Psy., p. I09.
'H. T. Moore, The Comparative Influence of Majority and Expert Opinion,
(1921) 32 Am. J. Psy. 16.
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victim of constant, subtle suggestion, and whether the witness is an
unusually suggestible person. 3 Children up to the age of puberty are
extremely suggestible,94 as are illiterate negroes and feebleminded or
hysteric persons, " and their testimony may be the result of sug-
gestions made often in their presence by their superiors, or of their
vagueness as to the difference between imagination and actuality, or
even of the suggestions embodied in, or implied by, the examiner's
questions.95 The medicine show, the oil-stock salesman, carefully
dressed show-windows, billboards and magazines, the fervid evange-
list, the witty auctioneer, the impassioned trial lawyer-all are con-
vincing evidence of the power of suggestion to make men alter their
conceptions of facts and change their opinions.9 7
Leading questions, as the law has long recognized, by their sug-
gestiveness encourage errors; Whipple found mildly suggestive
questions increased error io%, strongly suggestive ones, 33% (total
error 61%). 98 Burtt has carefully checked the work of Muscio in
this field,99 finding that the negative-objective form of question is the
93Suggested tests of suggestibility: In rapid sequence present eight cards having
right and left line equal, followed by five cards on which one is slightly longer,
having witness call after each whether they are equal. A suggestible witness will
by his mental set for equal lengths commit errors in two or more of the last five
before he catches his error. Present to witness card having ten lines, each slightly
longer than its predecessor, except the last three are same length. Have him copy
these; a suggestible witness usually draws each line throughout longer than the
preceding line. Present a cartoon containing some details, and after witness has
examined it, take it from him and question him as to details, finally asking in
negative-objective form about some detail which might have been but was not
in the picture--"Wasn't there a small dog with the child?" A suggestible witness
will agree that there was.
94Guy M. WHIPPLE, MANUAL OF MENT. AND Piy. TESTs, (1910) p. 286 et seg.
9
'BuRTT, supra note 47, pp. iog-Ii5.
""Create, if you will, an idea of what the child is to hear and see, and the child is
very likely to see or hear what you desire. He can so lead the child by indirect
suggestion that the evidence will be wholly false and unreliable." BRowN, LEG.
PsY., p. 133. To same effect: McCARTY, supra note 13, p. 270; Ross, supra note
91, p. I5.
97"Many a man thinks he makes up his mind, whereas, in truth, it is made up
for him br some masterful associate who talked with him last." Ross, supra
note 91, p. 12. "Suggestions are true forces and enact themselves unless they
meet resistance." Ross, p. 13.
98Whipple found an average error of 38% for mildly suggestive questions, 61%
for strongly suggestive ones, as compared with 28% error for non-suggestive
questions. The Obtaining of Information (1918) 15 PsY. BULLETIN, 245.
"Muscio's work in this field (B. Muscio, The Influence of the Form of Question,
(1915) 8 BRIT. J. Psy. 551 et seq.)
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most suggestive. 00 Questions in double and triple negative are
productive of high error, the triple negative, "abolishing law abolish-
ing prohibition," more than half the time eliciting an answer opposite
from that intended by the witness. 110
Does the interrogatory or the narrative method produce the more
accurate testimony? Why not abolish the least effective? Here we
have clear-cut answers. Forced memory (answers to questions) is
less accurate than natural recall (free narration), but the inter-
rogatory covers a much greater range and brings out much infor-
mation that the narrative does not yield, the increase in range bringing
a resulting loss in accuracy due to the "forcing" of the memory.102
According to Whipple, about I i/o of a narrative is inaccurate, about
Y4 of a deposition, while 2% of the narratives are errorless and only
o.5% of the depositions."0  Marston's excellent work"'4 seems to
settle finally these questions: He found narrative the most accurate
and least complete of all forms; direct examination is zii% less ac-
curate, 9% more complete than narrative, while cross-examination is
18% less accurate than narrative and 7% less accurate than direct
examination but only 2% less complete than direct examination and
6% more complete than narrative, and, finally, there is a close corre-
lation between caution and both completeness and accuracy. His
finding of great caution on cross-examination is elementary to trial
lawyers. After warning witnesses that they would be tested, he
repeated the experiment using different material; this time he found,
as a result of the forewarning, completeness was improved 6%, but
10 0BuRTT (LEGAL Psy. pp. 122-130) indicated that "a" as compared with "the"
is about equally suggestive, that the negative ("not a") is more suggestive than
the positive ("a") form of question, that the objective ("was there") is more sug-
gestive than the subjective ("did you see"), and that the negative-objective form
("Wasn't there a... ?") is the most suggestive form of all these questions.
101E. E. Wembridge and E. R. Means, Voting on the Double Negative (i918) 2
J. APPLIED PSY. x56-I63.
102H. M. CADY, On the Psychology of Testimony (1924) 35 AMERICAN J. PsY.
Iio, experimentally proved that the best results are obtained by narrative with
supplemental questioning.
10 2GuY M. WEIPPLE, MANUAL OF MENT. AND PHY. TEsTs, (1910), p. 286 et seq.
"'Marston, in a carefully planned and controlled experiment, enacted an
incident before a group, then had them write out narratives of what occurred,
later quietly examining them, then vigorously cross-examining them. The aver-
ages were: For narrative, 2,3% completeness, 31 % on direct examination, and 29%
completeness on cross-examination; for accuracy, 94% for narrative, 83% for
direct examination, and 76% for cross-examination; for caution (tested by the
number of "don't know" answers), 4o% for direct examination and 52% for
cross-examination. W. M. Marston, Studies in Testimony (1924) 15 J. CaIM.
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 1-31.
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accuracy decreased 8%, caution decreased 32%. Since most wit-
nesses in court are not forewarned as to the events or that they will be
called, this second test is of little practical value to lawyers.
The form of the question is itself suggestive, as it may as frequently
suggest the wrong, as the right, answer,05 unless the examiner applies
to the questioning a keen insight into the principles of suggestion.
Except with sub-normal minds-children, hysterical.and hypnotized
persons, with whom the more direct the suggestion the readier the
acceptance-the more indirect, disarming and adroit the suggestion
the more effective it is, as the witness will defend his statements
aggressively in the same proportion that he is unconscious that they
result from suggestion-"' Every experienced lawyer knows in-
stances proving the power of suggestion to alter and to create testi-
mony; Swift and McCarty describe several cases in point; courts
have fully discussed this. 0 7
Bias has much the same effect as suggestion and probably affects
more testimony;108 certainly its characteristic aspects have received
careful attention in the reported decisions.109 "We easily believe
10 6SwrF, PsY. AND DAY'S WORK, p. 284, citing Kuhnan in AM. J. Psy. Vol.
XVI, P. 395.
106GRIFFITH, GEN. INTROD. PSY., p. 336; Ross, SOCIAL PsY., pp. 27, 19-21;
McCARTY, PsY. FOR LAWYER, p. 273.
1 0 7
MCCARTY, supra note io6, pp. 279-289; SWIFT, Supra note 105, pp. 273-289.
Both describe the Jester case, in which witnesses, children and strangers at the
time, described the incident of Jester driving past in a snowstorm, giving full
minute details, thirty years afterward. Shipman, J. in Hershey v. Blakesley, 33
Fed. 922, 924 (1888) remarks that courts, "are fully aware of the ease with which
honest witnesses can persuade themselves that they remember some bygone cir-
cumstance..." "We repeat events until we are ready to swear, in utmost sin-
cerity, that we are spectators of their occurrence." Miller v. Cotten, 5. Ga. 341,
349 (1848). "It is a very common thing for an honest witness to confuse his
recollection of what he actually observed with what he has persuaded himself to
have happened..." In re Wool, 36 Mich. 298, 302 (1877). What we read and
hear cause this illusion (Parker v. Hulme, 18 Fed. Cas. Io8, I Fish. Pat. Cas. 44
(1849)), especially in reproducing conversations where the "danger is that, even a
conscientious person, in trying to narrate a transaction which exists in his memory
in a faded or fragmentary state, will in his effort to make the reproduction seem
complete and natural, substitute fancy for fact, or fabricate the missing or for-
gotten links." (Hodge v. Amerman, 4o N. J. Eq. 99, 103, 3 Atl. 257 (1885)).
l0 g'An unprejudiced individual does not exist," according to Dr. William Allen
White, Expert Testimony in Proceedings Involving Questions of the Mental State of
the Defendant (1921) II J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY, 499. "Suggestions of idle
or of designing persons get to be mixed up with the recollections, which become
fainter and fainter, till at last their own fancy helps to mislead them. . ." McGreg-
orv. Topham, (Eng.) 3 H. L. Cas. 132, 149, xo Rep. 51 (185o).
20 9"The bias of a witness has a well known and pernicious influence in quicken-
ing or deadening his memory, and much allowance is made therefor in weighing
his testimony." 23 C. J., Evid. § 1772, cit. 8i cases.
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what we wish to be true,"11 0 is good psychology and sound law. Pro-
nounced bias produces perjury, but honest bias tends to intrude
upon and pervert recall increasingly as actual recall grows vague.
We tend to recall what we want to recall, "I especially when we are
uncertain of the true facts. Bias may be the deciding factor in filling
the gaps in memory, as when the owner of the car which, left running,
has injured someone, recalls positively that he stopped the car, cut off
the switch, set the brakes, etc. Personal interest facilitates the recall
of the desired and congenial, represses the unwanted and distaste-
ful.11 2 Our system of cross-examination assumes, correctly, that bias
of prejudice and sympathy are valuable allies and dangerous op-
ponents. Unconscious bias is more dangerous than conscious bias."3
In every witness there is "an empire of subconscious loyalties," likes
and dislikes, preferences and hatreds, some conscious, others un-
conscious, but all entering into and affecting what we perceive, how
we perceive it, and, most important of all, how we recall it."1
Two pertinent topics demand comment at this point: The maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and "testing memory" on cross-
examination; the first allows the jury upon finding a witness guilty of
one inaccuracy to discard all the evidence of that witness,"' the
second permits, under the present practice, rambling, purposeless
cross-examination. Of the maxim, Wigmore's statement, "Repeated
instances of inability to recollect give the right to doubt the correct-
ness of an alleged recollection,"' 1 6 is true only when the instances
are akin to, or similar to, the fact questioned."7 No correlation
exists between the types of memory in the same person; a good
memory for names may be a poor one for ideas, and the improvement
n0Tuner v. Hand, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,257,.3 Wall Jr. 88 (I855).
"'BuRTT, LEG. Psy., p. 93.
lDiscussion and study of a case "merge the vague with the certain, the im-
aginary with the real, the desired with the actual." MCCARTY, PSY. FOR LAWYER,
p. 219.
"'Barker, J. in Hargis v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 578 (i909).
1""We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can
never see them with any eyes except our own," Justice Cardozo has well said.
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, p. 12. Recollection is shaped by interest:
Miller v. Cohen, 173 Pa. 488, 494, 34 Atl. 219 (1896); Pierce v. Feagans, 39 Fed.
587, 590 (1889); Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J. Eq. 566, 585, 25 Atl. II (*891); Sunday
v. Gordon, 23 Fed. Cas. 408, Blatchf. & H. 569, 576 (1837).
M28 R. C. L. Witnesses § 244.
115WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, Vol. II, Sect. 995; 40 CYC. Witnesses § 2586-2591.
n "Inquiry into ability to recall dissimilar items is unprofitable and mislead-
ing." Hutchins, R. W. and Slesinger, D., Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. at p. 870.
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of one does not improve the other"' A nearsighted witness may
have a keen perception of odor or sound; a poor judge of speed
may describe exactly the position of the car after the wreck. We
have memories, not a memory;" 9 Mfinsterberg suggests three major
types of memory: Visual, accoustical, and motor, none of which is
correlated with any other. 20 An artist may vividly describe a view,
a musician exactly a sound, and an airplane pilot correctly a particu-
lar feeling; yet for other types of perception each may be very in-
accurate. Our juries rarely know or are told this; hence, they ignore
the pompous Latin phrase, or follow it blindly as the wisdom of the
ages, either course being equally unfair to the witness and the party
calling him. In the "testing of memory", judges could save time and
aid justice by restricting the questions to those which test the par-
ticular type of memory which is under impeachment; courts should
recognize that memory is not an entity, and should recognize that
one part may be accurate, another inaccurate' An enlightened dis-
cretion of the trial judge will prevent questions impeaching hearing
being asked as to sight, taste, or feeling, vice versa.
No study of memory of witnesses can ignore the so-called "dra-
matic experiments", m in which groups assembled for another purpose,
are confronted suddenly with a planned dispute or fight, acted or
in moving pictures, immediately after which the witnesses write out
descriptions or answer questions as to what took place. Sutherland's
n
1 8The recall of names, faces, words, or ideas have no correlation. Achilles,
Experimental Studies in Recall and Recognition (I92O), ARCHIVES. Psy. No. 44.
Memory for nonsense improved, does not improve mempry for prose or poetry.
Sleight, Memory and Formal Training 4 BRIT. J. Psy. 386.
1 19Davies, Professor Titchener's Theory of Memory and Imagination (1912), 19
Psy. REV. p. 147. 12 °MfJNSTERBERG, supra note 33, p. 61.
2'Hutchins and Slesinger have pointed out that the law still accepts the ob-
solete and discredited "faculty psychology", which assumed that memory is an
entity, and that a particular person's memory is either accurate as to all or in-
accurate as to all. Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory (1928) 41
HARV. L. REV. p. 860.
InVon Liszt, University of Berlin, made one of the earliest of these tests; he
found 26% to 8o% errors in the reports, many important details completely
changed; the last half of the experiment, being strongly emotional, revealed 15%
more errors than the first half. MjDNSTERBERG, supra note 33, P. 50; SWIFT,
supra note 105, p. 303; MCCARTY, supra note 13, p. 207; L. W. Stem, Zur Psy-
chologied Aussage, 12 L'ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 182. Of 40 professional men,
Gates found 13 omitted So% important facts, the other 27 from 20% to 5o%, and
that 5% to 50% of the facts they were willing to swear to were erroneous. ELEM.
PsY. p. 2-5. In other tests Io% to 4o% of the questions were not answered, and
those answered were wrong in 8% to So% of the instances. GATES, PsY. FOR
STUD. EDUC., 2-3.
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are representative findings: A general error, under the most favorable
conditions, of 25%, .estimates of the man's height, for example, vary-
ing from "four feet" to "six feet six inches."'2 Burtt found 4 omitted
5o% of the details, that the average omission was 40%, even when
warned beforehand, and that the average description of a person
overestimated height 5 inches, missed the age 8 years, and could not
give an approximation of the hair color in 83% of the instances.12 4
Dean Wigmore suggested that judges and juries were more accurate
than the witnesses they relied upon, and suggested this be tested; lu
experiments indicate that he was correct.2 ' How close these ex-
periments indicate the general error of witnesses, judges, or jurors, in
actual trials, we can only surmise. Studies of the effect of the oath,
indicate that it reduces error and increases caution; according to
Stern there are 1.82 times the errors in unsworn as in sworn testi-
mony, 1.89 times according to Borst, 1.8 according to Brown, 8% to
9% greater error according to Boring.12 7 It seems probable that
verdicts and judgments approach the truth much more closely than
'"SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY, p. 271.
124BuRTT, LEG. PsY., p. 15. The following are illustrative of the many "dra-
matic experiments": McKeever, W.A., Psychology in Relation to Testimony KANSAS
BAR ASS'N. PROC. (1911) p. 113. GRIFFITH, GEN. INTROD. Psy., p. 407; DOCERY
GEN. Psy., p. 63. SWIFT, PSY. AND DAY'S WORE, P. 291; MINSTERBERG, ON
WITNESS STAND, p. 49. AiNo, GUNTENER, DRAMATIC INCIDENT, p. 583; WIG-
MORE, PRIN. OF JUDICIAL PROOF, p. 581, (2nd Ed. I931) p. 540.
ulThe Psychology of Testimony, (1909) 3 ILL. L. REV. 426; PRIN. JUD. PROOF,
p. 591.
261Radbruch found the judges were substantially correct, though the nine
witnesses made the usual errors. Zavadsld found judges unanimously avoided the
grossest errors, with average of 2o.6% error as against 27% for witnesses, each
judge picking as most accurate the witness actually most accurate. Detmold
found that in spite of witness' errors a composite picture substantially correct
could be formed. Guntener found two judges 1oo% in identification though the
identifying witnesses were 8o.6% in error, and that the judges were 87.4%,
9o.6%, respectively, correct as to all findings as compared with 79.9% for the wit-
nesses on which they relied. Wigmore, The Psychology of Testimony (1909) 3
ILL. L. REv., 426. Marston Studies in Testimony 15 J. CRim. L. AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 5-31 found judges both more complete and more accurate than the juries,
that female juries are more accurate than male juries but less accurate than
judges, and that juries are 3.4% more complete and 2.6% less accurate than the
average of the witnesses relied upon.
'2WHIPIPLE, MANUAL OF MENT. AND PHY. TEsTs, p. 286 et seq. According to
Burtt (LEG. Psy. p. 153) in one study 20% to 25% error became only io% under
oath; another showed 92% accuracy under oath, 86% where witness felt assur-
ance of truth, and 56% where witness believed but was not willing to commit
himself. Boring (6 AM. INST. Clam. LAW (1916) 820) found sworn more ac-
curate than unsworn as follows: Women, 8%; men, 9%; girls, 15%; boys, 13%.
See BROWN, LEG. Psy., (1926), p. 73.
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hasty conclusions from the experiments would indicate;- certainly
judges and jurors apply a certain amount of intuitive knowledge of
human nature, often "feeling out" the truth beyond the record evi-
dence, and judgments and verdicts speak accordingly.
This study of memory has indicated to trial lawyers that faulty
memory may be attacked most effectively along three distinct lines:
(I) The original perception of the event or detail may have been
defective; (2) the details may not have been fixated, may have
been forgotten, or imagination may have altered, added to, or changed
them; (3) the original perception may have become interwoven with
or altered by suggestion from outside sources. Tests directed at the
perception of the witness, his retentiveness, imagination, caution,
bias, and suggestibility will be most fruitful. The important ques-
tions to consider concerning his memory are: Did he perceive as he
now recalls it? Has his memory retained, without addition or sub-
traction, the original perception? Does imagination, bias or sug-
gestion color his present recollection?
Memory, however faulty, can not be amended or abolished; it
must continue to furnish the grist from which our tribunals (crude,
clumsy, obsolete though they be) grind the fine meal of truth. The
scales of justice, wrought in the age of bronze, hang streaked with
the canker of feudalism and enmeshed in the cobwebs of pioneer
tradition, but the battered balance pans, ever-adjusted by a bar and
judiciary alert to the cumulative findings of science, may still weigh
out impartial justice. Lawyers, judges and jurors are "called upon
to act as amateur psychologists,"1 2 8 and "if courts will open their
minds to the realization that science can be applied to the judgment
of testimonial credit, regardless of the rules arising before the days of
modem science, they will readily follow a liberal practice."129  A
constant study of the weakness and strength of memory, its re-
liability in certain particulars and under certain conditions, and the
effect of the various factors acting upon it, as revealed to us from
time to time by psychology, will eventually enable us to evaluate
properly the testimony of witnesses and thereby render more effective
the eternal striving of our courts to approximate absolute justice in
each individual case.
12sCHAUBERLA-*NE, EVIDENCE, Vol. III, § 1774, n. IO.
129WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Vol. II, § 990.
